Un paio di mesi fa ho trovato in edicola contemporaneamente diverse riviste che si ponevano domande preoccupanti sul futuro della democrazia.
In particolare l'Atlantic conteneva un paio di articoli molto interessanti. Il primo e' di Anne Applebaum e si intitola "A warning from Europe" e usa le vicende politiche della Polonia per alcune osservazioni molto utili: "Unlike Marxism, the Leninist
one-party state is not a philosophy. It is a mechanism for holding
power. It works because it clearly defines who gets to be the elite [...]. In monarchies
such as prerevolutionary France and Russia, the right to rule was
granted to the aristocracy [...]. In modern Western democracies, the right to rule
is granted, at least in theory, by different forms of competition:
campaigning and voting, meritocratic tests that determine access to
higher education and the civil service, free markets. Old-fashioned
social hierarchies are usually part of the mix, but in modern Britain,
America, Germany, France, and until recently Poland, we have assumed
that competition is the most just and efficient way to distribute power.
The best-run businesses should make the most money. The most appealing
and competent politicians should rule. The contests between them should
take place on an even playing field, to ensure a fair outcome.Lenin’s
one-party state was based on different values. [...] The
Bolshevik one-party state was not merely undemocratic; it was also
anticompetitive and antimeritocratic. Places in universities,
civil-service jobs, and roles in government and industry did not go to
the most industrious or the most capable. Instead, they went to the most
loyal. People advanced because they were willing to conform to the
rules of party membership. Though those rules were different at
different times, they were consistent in certain ways. [...] Above all, they favored people who loudly professed belief in the
creed, who attended party meetings, who participated in public displays
of enthusiasm. Unlike an ordinary oligarchy, the one-party state allows
for upward mobility: True believers can advance. As Hannah Arendt wrote
back in the 1940s, the worst kind of one-party state “invariably
replaces all first-rate talents, regardless of their sympathies, with
those crackpots and fools whose lack of intelligence and creativity is
still the best guarantee of their loyalty.”"
"You can call this sort of thing by many names: nepotism, state capture. But if you so choose, you can also describe it in positive terms: It represents the end of the hateful notions of meritocracy and competition, principles that, by definition, never benefited the less successful. A rigged and uncompetitive system sounds bad if you want to live in a society run by the talented. But if that isn’t your primary interest, then what’s wrong with it?"
"The Smolensk conspiracy theory, like the Hungarian migration conspiracy
theory, served another purpose: [...] it offered a new reason to distrust the
politicians, businesspeople, and intellectuals who had emerged from the
struggles of the 1990s and now led the country. More to the point, it
offered a means of defining a new and better elite. There was no need
for competition, or for exams, or for a résumé bristling with
achievements. Anyone who professes belief in the Smolensk lie is by
definition a true patriot—and, incidentally, might well qualify for a
government job."
Il secondo articolo e' dello storico molto di moda ultimamente Yuval Noah Harari e si intitola "Why technology favors tyranny" e nonostante non dica molto di nuovo rispetto a quanto gia' chiarito da Evgeny Morozov in "The net delusion", un promemoria fa sempre bene: "A facade of free choice and free voting may remain in place in some countries, even as the public exerts less and less actual control. To be sure, attempts to manipulate voters’ feelings are not new. But once somebody (whether in San Francisco or Beijing or Moscow) gains the technological ability to manipulate the human heart—reliably, cheaply, and at scale—democratic politics will mutate into an emotional puppet show."
"You can call this sort of thing by many names: nepotism, state capture. But if you so choose, you can also describe it in positive terms: It represents the end of the hateful notions of meritocracy and competition, principles that, by definition, never benefited the less successful. A rigged and uncompetitive system sounds bad if you want to live in a society run by the talented. But if that isn’t your primary interest, then what’s wrong with it?"
"The Smolensk conspiracy theory, like the Hungarian migration conspiracy
theory, served another purpose: [...] it offered a new reason to distrust the
politicians, businesspeople, and intellectuals who had emerged from the
struggles of the 1990s and now led the country. More to the point, it
offered a means of defining a new and better elite. There was no need
for competition, or for exams, or for a résumé bristling with
achievements. Anyone who professes belief in the Smolensk lie is by
definition a true patriot—and, incidentally, might well qualify for a
government job." Il secondo articolo e' dello storico molto di moda ultimamente Yuval Noah Harari e si intitola "Why technology favors tyranny" e nonostante non dica molto di nuovo rispetto a quanto gia' chiarito da Evgeny Morozov in "The net delusion", un promemoria fa sempre bene: "A facade of free choice and free voting may remain in place in some countries, even as the public exerts less and less actual control. To be sure, attempts to manipulate voters’ feelings are not new. But once somebody (whether in San Francisco or Beijing or Moscow) gains the technological ability to manipulate the human heart—reliably, cheaply, and at scale—democratic politics will mutate into an emotional puppet show."
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